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This thesis explores the unique security requirements o-f
the Local Area Networks (LAN)s within the Administrative
Sciences Department Instructional Laboratories at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cali-fornia. Current
operating procedures, direction -from the Department of
De-fense and Navy sources, views o-f computer professionals
and case studies of microcomputer labs at other educational
institutions, are examined to identify areas where security
improvements can be made.
Security topics covered include; physical security,
equipment tamper—proof ing, software protection and damage
caused maliciously or unintentionally by users. The threat
imposed on the various LANs by users, viruses, and the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
The San Francisco Examiner ran an article by John Dvorak
on Sunday August 6th titled "Viruses Make Me Sick". The
author speaks o-f the first-ever International Hackers
convention in Amsterdam where the Chaos Computer Club o-f
Germany announced the release o-f a virus, "Datacrime"
(actually a logic bomb) which will activate on October 12 o-f
any year. Any unlucky system in-fected by it stands to have
a low level -format performed on it's hard disk. Be it a
joke or some type of political statement, the computer
community is anxious to find out all it can in order to
minimize the effect of this virus.
This is just one of the many articles appearing in print
on a daily basis which deals with the broad topic of
computer security. What used to be a topic discussed only
in obscure computer journals, is now making the cover of
Time Magazine . Security awareness within the computing
industry is the topic for the nineties as the threat is
becoming more visible.
At the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Administrative
Science Department microcomputer network laboratories,
protection of hardware and so-ftware elements is a concern.
Guidance has been given in several Department o-f the Navy
and Naval Postgraduate School Instructions on physical
security, risk assessment and Automated Data Processing
(ADP) security. The focus of these instructions is on large
computer systems or office automation networks with
dedicated users where data integrity is the most important
issue. Applicability to an academic Local Area Network
(LAN) laboratory is different due to the unique environments
in which they operate.
The labs operated by the Administrative Science
Department are set up to operate in an educational
environment. They Are used by, faculty within the
department for classroom instruction, the computer center
operations personnel for instruction purposes, and students
of the school for accomplishing assignments. The users of
the labs are many and their computing needs varied, thus
creating the requirement for innovative protection methods.
Since maximizing availability of computing resources is
the goal of the Administrative Science networks, the
laboratories operate around the clock, seven days-a—week in
an unsupervised environment. Traditional security
protection methods were developed primarily for the
protection of shared data among network users where the data
is vital to organizational operations. This thesis is
concerned with the protection o-f network resources, both
hardware and applications so-ftware which operate in this
"open" environment. Protecting application programs from
corruption and preventing the proliferation of
"unauthorized" user files are the most important security
problems faced by lab management.
Further complicating the issue is the fact that the
administration and upkeep of the Administrative Science labs
is done pro bono by faculty and students on a volunteer
basis. This limits the amount of "staff" available to
perform routine tasks and precludes the use of labor
intensive security methods such as registering each network
user and assigning passwords.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate potential
solutions to the following questions:
How can networks operating in an academic environment
provide the most service to a wide range of users while
protecting itself from intentional or unintentional
harm?
What security methods will provide this protection
without placing unnecessary burdens on administrators
and restrictions on users?
- What Are the threats to be guarded against?
• What Skr& the requirements of current Department of
Defense (DOD) , Department of the Navy (DON), and Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) instructions on physical and
automated data processing security?
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Investigation into solutions to the above questions
involved three di-f-ferent but concurrent approaches. First
hand experience was obtained while working (still ongoing)
as a network lab assistant for the Administrative Science
Department. This allowed close observation o-f day to day
operations on the various Local Area Networks (LAN's).
Security problems were observed on a -first hand basis as
well as the implementation o-f innovative solutions.
The second approach involved the review o-f existing
literature to discover what the experts had to say on this
topic. This included DOD, DON, NFS and Navy Data Automation
Center (NAVDAC) instructions to determine compliance with
existing direction. Articles -from current publications,
proceedings -from con-ferences and computer related journals
provided insight into security issues -facing the computer
community.
Finally, in an attempt to learn from collective
experience, other academic institution's LAN implementations
were reviewed to get an idea o-f the problems they -faced and
what was done to correct them. It is hoped that by doing so
some o-f the pit-falls they experienced can be avoided in LAN
operations within Administrative Sciences.
The remainder o-f this thesis is organized as -follows:
Chapter II continues with a discussion o^^ the various
laboratories and LANs operating within the Administrative
Science Department. Equipment con-figurations and network
operating procedures are introduced to develop an
environmental framework -for security requirements.
Chapter III is concerned with the security threats which
must be guarded against. The physical security problems o-f
theft prevention, damage to equipment and denial of use are
covered along with threats posed by users and the recent
phenomena of computer viruses.
Chapter IV outlines DOD and DON security guidelines for
ADP systems. The Naval Postgraduate School ADP Security
Plan is examined to determine its applicability to
Administrative Science LANs.
Other educational institution's LAN implementations are
explored in Chapter V for insight into other methods of
operation. Problems in LAN security faced by these
universities Are brought out so as not to be repeated.
Solutions and conclusions are presented in Chapter VI
which include security precautions already in place
throughout Administrative Science labs as well as
recommendations for improving them. An ideal academic LAN
of the future is discussed along with the necessity for a
dedicated lab staff.
II. NETWORK OPERATIONS
A. LABORATORY EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION
The NFS Admin Science Department operates three labora-
atories and -five distinct LANs in Ingersoll Hall. These
labs are designated 1-224, 1-250, and 1-158, with each lab
having di-f-ferent equipment con-figurations and unique
operating requirements.
1. 1-224 Networks
1-224 is the most popular lab o-f the three
consisting o-f an IBM Token-Ring PC LAN, a 3Com Ethernet and
an AppleTalk Macintosh LAN. The lab is used -for classroom
instruction by members o-f the Administrative Science
Department and computer center sta-ff. In addition, the
networks are operational 24 hours a day to support student
use.
a. IBM Token-Rino LAN
Operating on the Token—Ring are 12 Standard 286
machines each with 20MB hard disks, 3 IBM XTs with 20MB
hardcards, an IBM AT (server) with a 20MB hard disk and an
IBM Proprinter II attached, and an IBM XT server with a 20MB
hardcard and an attached Proprinter. Each computer on the
ring has a Token-Ring card installed, and connectivity is
provided by shielded twisted—pair cable running to a multi-
access unit (MAU) . The MAUs provide the internal circuitry
to trans-Form a physical star topology into a logical ring.
The necessary network so-ftware is installed on
the hard dri ve/hardcard o-f each server and user node in a
network sub-directory. Additionally, the servers contain
the applications so-ftware which is to be shared among the
various user nodes. These programs are physically stored on
the -fixed disk of the server computers and are transparent
to the users who see them displayed as a virtual drive
designation (e.g. D: , E: , F: > . The "D: " directory contains
".bat" -files to execute applications stored in other virtual
drives and is the primary user inter-face.
Complicating this hardware configuration is the
fact that several o-f the Standard 286 machines have
installed co-processors while others have modems or IBM 3270
main-frame emulation capability. One IBM XT on the network,
the instructors machine, has all three enhancements while
the remaining two XTs share only main-frame emulation. These
di-f-ferent con-figurations require a start—up process which
checks each computer set—up to determine its available
hardware be-fore starting the network,
b. 3COM Ethernet
Smaller and less popular than its IBM neighbor,
this network consists o-f 4 IBM XTs, 1 PC (both with 20MB
hardcards) , a 3Server3 File Server with 70MB storage
capacity, and an IBM Propr inter. As on the Token-Ring, both
the user and server nodes have the necessary network
so^^tware installed to share applications stored on the file
server and to use printer resources. Currently there are no
modems or main-frame emulation capabilities to be concerned
with on this LAN.
c. Appl eTal k Network
This network consists o-f 5 user and one
dedicated -file server Macintosh Plus's along with a 45MB
Rodime hard disk and an Apple LaserWriter. Since the -file
server is the only unit with a -fixed disk, each user Mac
must boot and start the network -from a -floppy 3.5 inch disk.
As with 3Com, there Are no modems or main-frame connections
involved in this network. Application so-ftware resides on a
-fixed disk volume called HD 20 and is available to users as
a shared resource. Only one user may access a certain
application at a time. Multiple copies o-f each application
3.re required i -f more than one user is to work with certain
software packages. The LaserWriter is not directly attached
to the file server as on the IBM and 3Com LANs but is
considered by the network as an addressable node. Being the
only printer on the network it is a costly item to operate
in terms of toner and copier grade paper and is restricted
to use between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM.
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2- 1-250 IBM PC LAN
This lab consists o-f one large network made up o-f 25
IBM XTs user computers, 4 IBM AT file servers (each with
30MB hard disk capacity) three o-f which have IBM Proprinters
attached. Since none o-F the user computers have fixed disk
capacity, each machine must be booted up and started on the
network from a floppy disk. Once on the network, each user
node can share applications software and printer services
provided by any of the file servers.
There Bre several advantages of this network over
the other previously mentioned systems. One is the redun-
dancy provided by the multiple file servers. If one of the
file servers should go down, the network can continue to
operate on the remaining three, thus ensuring graceful
degradation. Another advantage of this system is the lack
of a fixed disk storage device on individual user machines.
The user can save his work only on floppy disks thus
eliminating the necessity to clean and back up each fixed
disk as is required on the Token—Ring and 3Com LANs. This
is a considerable time savings advantage to the network
administrator as well as a software protection device
against inadvertent destruction of data.
A slight disadvantage of the PC LAN is that not all
the user XTs have the same hardware configuration. As in
the Token-Ring some machines have modems, mainframe
emulation cards, and/or co-processors installed which
changes the capability o-f the various user nodes and the
software that they can share -from the -file server. This
requires that each user computer have a start-up disk unique
to each node that reflects the current machine
configuration.
3. 1-158 Operations
This lab is used primarily as an experimental
facility where the administrators can prototype software or
hardware configuration changes on a small Token—Ring or PC
LAN Ethernet. The lab also supports students conducting
research on local areai network topics and provides laser
printer services for IBM based software programs to general
users.
The small IBM Token-Ring LAN consists of: 1 IBM AT
file server, 1 IBM XT print server, 1 IBM 3148 laser
printer, 1 IBM graphics printer, and 3 IBM XT user machines
with 20MB fixed disks. Boot-up and network start software
for the user nodes are located on each computers fixed disk
while application software is stored on the file server
-
Use of this LAN is primarily by individuals desiring laser
quality output for their word processing documents.
Adjoining room 158 is a private "for lab staff only"
room containing an IBM PC LAN Ethernet and a Token-Ring LAN
for prototyping. Because this network is not accessible to
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the general user a standard user operating envirc>nment is
not provided nor is the system running 24 hours a day. The
room and equipment along with 1-224 and 1-250 are protected
by physical security devices which are described in Chapter
III.
B. RUNNING THE NETWORKS
The preceding sections o-f this chapter have concen-
trated on the physical configurations o-f the various LANs in
order to understand the physical protection which is
required. This, however, is only a portion of what a well
formulated security policy must consider. Protection from
the malicious authorized user and from unintentional damage
caused by the unsophisticated user is implemented within
network operating procedures. The following sections
describe how the various LANs operate and what safeguards
are in place to keep these systems secure.
1. Token-Ring Operations in 1-224
Upon entry to the lab, a user will access the
network by turning on a user node computer. An AUTOEXEC.BAT
file will execute setting a unique identifier for that
particular machine which is used for checking the hardware
configuration. Instructions are displayed on the screen
informing the user that to start the network the word
"START" must be typed followed by a name. This name
11
identifies the user to others on the network -for message
transactions and is used to create separators -for printer
output. Once "start" and a "name" are entered the
appropriate network software and input parameters are
executed placing the user in a network virtual drive <D:
)
from which desired batch files can be selected to start
various applications.
If stand-alone operation is desired, the instruc-
tions inform the user to enter an appropriate command at the
DOS prompt. In this mode the user will not be able to use
printer resources or share the software available on the
server.
2. 3COM EtherSeries Operations
Logging on this network involves a slightly
different process. After turning on the computer and
monitor, the AUTOEXEC.BAT file loads portions of the
EtherSeries software and presents the user with a logon
screen. The user responds to this screen (requests for
names and passwords) with predetermined replies posted near
each user computer. System responses will appear followed
by a directory of shared volumes from which the user may
choose. At this point the user can elect to use the machine
as a stand-alone by entering any desired command at the DOS
prompt or execute a program from a shared volume. Users are
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allowed to create volumes on the ^er\/er and establish them
as either public, private or shared.
A disadvantage to a user creating these volumes is
that he must remember what user name was used to create
them. For example, i-f a person logged on to the LAN using
"enetl" and created a private volume, that volume will only
be accessible to him i-f he uses "enetl" the next time in the
lab. I-f someone else is using "enetl", the creator will not
be able to log on under that name and will be prevented from
using the private volume he established-
3. Getting Started on AppleTalk
Since each Macintosh Plus does not have a dedicated
hard disk, the user inserts a disk -found near each machine
in order to logon. These disks contain the necessary
so-ftware to boot the machine and start it on the network.
User start-up disks do not require a unique node identi-fier.
This distinguishes it -from the IBM PC LAN. Use o-f the boot
disk ensures correct network start procedures by automating
the process resulting in simpler operations and a standard
user inter-face.
Once the start—up procedure has completed, a
standard Macintosh user inter-face screen appears displaying
icons -for the user disk, the shared server volume (HD 20),
and the trash can. At this point the user can select and
execute applications so-ftware stored on the server volume.
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provided no other user is currently using that particular
program. This is a limitation o-f the AppleShare so-ftware
which places locks on some programs being executed by a
user. This is a nuisance to the network administrators who
must place multiple copies o-f these applications on the
server volume to permit concurrent usage. However, there
Qre some application programs which permit multiple access
to a single copy.
4. Using the IBM PC-LAN Ethernet
These computers are similar to the AppleNet in that
the user machines do not have -fixed disk storage; each
computer must be started from a user diskette. Each disk
contains the necessary -files to boot the machine, identify
its hardware configuration, and start the network, using
predetermined parameters. All of this goes on without user
involvement until a direction screen appears informing the
user to type "start" followed by a name. Once entered, the
start-up process is allowed to continue and identifies the
person logging on so other network users may send mail to
him/her. The name that was entered is also used to identify
printer output as belonging to that individual.
From this point on operations are identical to those
on the Token-Ring. The user is placed in a network virtual
drive from which desired applications can be invoked through
.bat files depending on the hardware configuration of the
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computer started. For example, a machine without an
installed modem will not be able to execute a communications
package such as SIMPC even though it is made available for
use by the -file server. The start—up process has in-formed
the network that this computer does not have a modem and
instructs it to intercept requests to start so-ftware which
requires them.
III. THE SECURITY THREAT
Two -fundamental considerations -for any network
administrator are how much security to implement and to
determine the threat -From which systems must be protected.
Any implemented security -features must be a balance between
productivity, cost and convenience. This chapter will
investigate the assessed risk to LANs operating within
Administrative Sciences in order to -formulate a measured
security response.
A. LOSS PREVENTION
Included within this category are three distinct losses;
those caused by the-ft, those caused by damage to equipment
and the loss su-f-fered by users through denial of network
use. The -first two losses are more easily quanti-f iable in
terms of a dollar value although the third is no less
important and requires protection measures. Naval
Postgraduate School <NPS) Instruction 5530.2 tasks deans,
department heads, curricular officers and department
chairmen for the security of personnel, property and spaces
assigned to their departments, and to comply with NFS loss





The primary concerns o-f the lab sta-f-f are to prevent
loss or damage to the equipment under their care Mhile
providing the greatest availability of computing resources
to the many users. Loss protection involves safeguarding
all Automated Information Systems <AIS) against; sabotage,
tampering, denial of services, fraud, misappropriation,
misuse or release to unauthorized persons Cref.2:p.23. To
accomplish this goal, three potential problem areas Are
addressed: physical security, preventing equipment damage
and limiting down time.
1. Physical Security
"Physical security is that part of security
concerned with measures designed to prevent unauthorized
access to equipment, installations, material and documents,
and to safeguard them against sabotage, damage and theft"
Eref.3:p 1—33. Within the context of the lab environment
this involves controlling access and preventing theft.
Access control is provided by cipher locks installed
on each door to the labs. The combination to these locks is
obtained by request from a member of the lab staff or in a
less formal manner, by taking a course offered by the
Administrative Science Deptartment where the labs are used
for instructional purposes (Instructors often give the
combination out to their class for convenience reasons). An
effort is made to have the combinations changed at least
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once a quarter to disallow entry to those who no longer
require the lab -facilities.
In addition to the cipher locks, all equipment
within the labs are secured to tables and stands by locks
and cables. This tethering prevents unauthorized movement
and protects against misappropriation. Supplies and admin-
istrative documentation Are stored in a locked storage
cabinet as Are keys for the various equipment. Only the lab
sta-F-F personnel have access to these keys and combinations.
2. Damage to Equipment
The goal o-f this protection plan is to guard as much
as possible against damage whether intentional (sabotage) or
accidental. Complete protection against the malicious user
dedicated to bringing down a network is an unachievable goal
without unlimited resources or placing severe restrictions
on good -faith users. In this loss prevention category the
concern is with physical damage to LAN equipment caused by
careless operation (e.g. jamming or forcing disks into
floppy drives) or environmental factors such as fire,
humidity or foreign object destruction (e.g. a drink spilled
into the keyboard). Unfortunately, these areas can be tough
to guard against.
User training is the most efficient means of
minimizing damage caused by these hazards. A 1 ab staff
member cannot be made available to check every time a disk
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is inserted into a -floppy drive or a favorite so-ft drink is
placed two inches -from a keyboard. Instead, upon introduc-
tion to the network labs, instructors could spend a -few
minutes explaining basic "do's and don'ts" of lab operations
to new users. When lab combinations are Qiven out
signatures should be obtained in exchange for pre—printed
instructions which explain lab rules and policies
Cref . 4: p. 643 . Any necessary updates could be given out in
the form of news letters or when combination changes require
re-regi stering.
Training in the proper care of disk media is also
necessary to prevent system damage. Dirt, heat, pressure
fingerprints, soft drinks and magnets have detrimental
effects on system operation and can cause damage to floppy
drive heads Cref . 5: p. 183 . Awareness of these threats are
not often current in the minds of busy users as evidenced by
one individual who used to put his magnetic paper clip
holder on a stack of floppy disks!
Maintaining a proper physical environment in which
the LANs operate is the responsibility of the network
administrator. Room temperature and humidity should be
monitored to ensure that recommended manufacturers operating
conditions Are met. These environmental factors also have
an effect on physical security. When ventilation is secured
in Ingersoll Hall each workday evening, the labs become an
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uncom-f ortable place in which to work. Regardless o-f the
number of warning signs to the contrary, discomforted users
will prop open the doors to the labs in an attempt to
increase circulation. This circumvents the installed cipher
locks and leads to a physical security violation.
3. Denial of Use
The end result of equipment loss or damage is to
limit the amount of time that the LAN or a node on the LAN
is available for use. This loss is not easily quantifiable
as a dollar amount. A non—operational LAN can force an
instructor to change or cancel a class or cause a user who
is dependent on the network to fail to complete an important
project. The result is unnecessary hardship on these
individuals as well as bringing unfavorable attention on the
network administrator and lab staff.
B. USER THREATS
The greatest source of security control to an organiza-
tion can also present the greatest threat Cref . 4: p. 633
.
Three groups of personnel account for the human threat to
Administrative Science LANs: malicious authorized users,
unauthorized users and non-malicious authorized users.
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1. The Internal Threat
Much evidence has been collected -from various
sources which shows that the primary threat to computer
systems comes -from within.
• "75% o-f all computer crimes Are reportedly committed by
insiders where monetary gain is not their primary
motive. O-f ten they are thrill seekers or disgruntled
employees." Cref.6:p.313
"Intrusions -from employees are far more damaging Cthan
intrusions from hackers! but have not been widely
publicized." Cref . 7: p. 293D
• "Whom do you consider to be a threat against your
network?
- internal employees 81.6yC
- outside hackers 17.3yC
- someone else l.OTi (total 98 responding)
Cref .6:p.303
- "To counter threats of physical security... concern is
not only focused on the threat... by forces external to
the organization... but also specifically toward
internal causes; theft and pilferage by those who have
authorized access, inattention to physical security
practices and procedures and disregard for property
controls and accountability Cref . 3: p. 1-3D .
"
Two of the three groups fall within the internal
threat category for the Administrative Science Department:
malicious users and those causing unintentional damage.
Protection against unauthorized users should be accomplished
through physical security measures. To protect against both
of these threats, limits must be placed on what is
accessible to users over the network. This must be
accomplished without having to create separate user accounts
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and setting individual privilege tables. That would create
an administrative nightmare -for the limited lab sta-ff
considering the number o-f users and -frequency o-f turnover.
A destructive user must be prevented -from erasing or
modifying important application so-ftware while the
unintentional user should be "steered" away -from potential
harm.
Liberal use o-f write protect mechanisms prevent
erasure or modi -fi cation to important files but does not
prevent use of the DOS rename function. This inherent
oversight in the disk operating system allows changing names
of files called by the main program of an application even
though the write protect attribute is set. When that file
cannot be found an error message is produced and depending
upon the application, program execution may cease. Another
poor security aspect of DOS is that the Attrib command only
protects files; it does not protect directories. This
enables users to create files on a user computer hard disk
which then must be removed by the lab staff. A feature such
as that available on the IBM PC LAN network operating system
which allows entire server directories to be set as read-
only would be a welcomed addition in future releases.
Loopholes like this should not be a surprise since, as one
reference states: "Contemporary operating systems are
designed for functionality in the constraint of performance
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and have not been designed with the aim o-f security"
Ere-f .7:p.2973.
It was mentioned earlier that ".bat" -files on DOS
based LANs are another excellent method of controlling the
user. From a directory created on a network virtual drive a
person can start any application available on the network
without having to traverse to the actual directory where the
software is stored. This tends to prevent "wandering" while
simultaneously configuring the system to write output to a
floppy disk which the user can take from one computer to
another thereby enhancing portability- This is a desired
feature for the Administrative Science LANs since all user
nodes Bre available on a first come first served basis.
Network software on the 3COM Ethernet and AppleTalk
LANs provide the administrator with the capability to set up
entire volumes with specific access rights. Although
helpful when used to protect data and network operating
system software from deliberate or unintentional
modification, this function is not desired when the goal is
to share applications since not all of them can be placed in
write protected volumes. The bottom line in any network
environment to prevent against the loss of stored software
is to conduct backups regularly.
2. The External Threat
In this instance the external threat refers to the
unauthorized person using lab -facilities. Naval
Postgraduate School Instruction 5239.1 de-Fines an authorized
user as, "government personnel on government business"
Cre-f .8:p. 5-21 . Since the Administrative Science LANs are
not accessible through dial-up connections, the possibility
o-f phone-in hackers is zero. There-fore the threat is
reduced to preventing ineligible personnel from entering the
labs and restricting the labs to government business.
Restricting LAN operations to government business is
a difficult policy to enforce on systems which operate
unattended around the clock. The Administrative Science
LANs Are to be used for unclassified nonsensitive government
or school related data processing. On one occasion
youngsters (presumably dependents of students or faculty)
were seen entering a network lab disks in hand. It is safe
to say they were not there on official business. Although
an isolated incident, this demonstrates the need for
improved awareness among users about lab policies.
C. THE THREAT OF VIRUSES
A popular topic in computer security literature is what
to do about the growing threat of computer viruses and
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worms. 0-Ften mistaken for one another, these threats are
de-fined by White as follows:
- Worms - "A proQram or series o-f programs that attack a
computer system directly by taking over processors and
attempting to per -form illegal -functions". They are much
larger than viruses and do not replicate.
• Viruses - "A computer virus is a program that attaches
an exact copy or a modified copy of itself to other
programs. Once infected... a program can infect other
software stored on secondary storage and destroy
programs and data." Cref . 9:p. 2833
Two other types of programs which are often confused with
viruses aire logic bombs and TroJan horses .
A loQJc bomb is typically a short program added to an
existing application. It is called a logic bomb because it
is set to "explode" when certain conditions Are met.
Cref.lO:p.43 The Datacrime virus introduced in Chapter I.
is an example of a logic bomb since it is set to go off when
the system clock date reads 12 October. Until this
condition is met the program will remain dormant and
possibly undetected.
A Trojan horse is a program which appears to be
legitimate while actually hiding another program which is
malicious. One particular example is a graphics program
which distracts the user by executing pretty images on the
screen while it is corrupting the systems hard drive.
Unlike a logic bomb a Trojan Horse will perform its
destruction each time it is executed without waiting for
conditions to be met. Cref.lO:p.7Il
Within the Administrative Science LANs the threat o-f a
virus is most prevalent on the AppleTalk network where the
users have write access to the hard disk volume where
applications are stored. It is all too easy to bring into
the lab a disk in-fected -from another source and install that
virus on a clean network where it can then spread to other
users. The threat to the IBM LANs is reduced by write
protecting server directories where possible. This does not
prevent viruses -from spreading to user nodes with -fixed disk
drives and vigilance is required by lab sta-f-f and users to
spot them i -f present.
1. Spotting a Virus
Finding viruses is not an easy task. Adney and
Kavanagh reveal some simple pointers which can help in
detecting them to prevent major damage -from occurring.
• You may notice that an in-fected system or network won't
per -form normally, there can be sudden and unexpected
-freezes using so-ftware run every day, or trouble using
the print or save command.
- Noticing hard or floppy disk activity occurring without
your command (unless your application software has an
auto-save feature)
.
- Keep an eye on the dates of system .com and .exe files.
They should not change or be different from the dates on
the master copy.
- For application software check to see that the date
shown is the date installed.
- Know which files don't belong on a disk.
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- With a utility that displays hidden -files, check -for
suspicious -files and out o-f the ordinary modi-f ication
dates. Cref . ll:p.2a6D
It is important to compare program files with the
master disks to check for viruses masquerading as some
harmless application. Even so this cannot guarantee that
your disks are clean. There have been occasions where
programs -furnished by stores or directly -from vendors have
been infected. The viruses become installed on software for
shipment by disgruntled employees or returned software (with
virus added) can be re—shrink wrapped by retailers and sold
to unsuspecting users. Cref . 12: p.41
1
2. What to do if Viruses Are Discovered
A common mistake among network administrators is to
attempt to keep discovery of a virus a secret. For fear of
looking incompetent or having others question the adequacy
of their systems, administrators choose to put a "tight lid"
on the discovery which simply prolongs the conditions and
allows the virus to spread. Making the fact known that the
virus exists can assist in eradication procedures and
prevents the spread by raising suspicion levels in users who
might have been in contact with that bug. Cref . 12:p. 663
Once users have been made aware that a virus exists,
it is time to implement clean up procedures. The first step
is to restrict LAN operations and quarantine all suspect
software. This is to prevent the further spread of the
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virus while clean-up is in progress. Purging the RAM o-F
in-fected machines is accomplished by turning o-f-f the power
for a minimum of 5 minutes Cref . 10: p.29D . I-f the computer
is an 80286 machine with CMOS RAM the battery source should
be removed also. This destroys any memory resident viruses.
Next, re-boot the computer -from a vendor supplied (write
protected) system disk and perform a complete reformat of
the fixed disk at least twice. Reinstall applications from
vendor supplied master disks. Reloading from back-ups is
not recommended unless the exact date of infection can be
determined. Finally, reinstall and rename any antiviral
software system files you may have. This protects the
software from viruses specifically targeted to interfere
with them. Cref . 12:p. 431
This chapter has discussed the threat from which the
Administrative Science LANs must protect themselves along
with particular implementable safety measures. Until now
the focus has been on the existing LAN configurations and
operating procedures as well as the hazards from which LANs
must be protected. The succeeding chapters Are concerned
with what can be done in addition to further LAN security.




Since the early 1970' s, agencies within the Federal
Government (particularly within DOD) have been attempting to
provide security guidance -for ADP systems. A brief history
o-f some o-f the more important documents -follows.
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF ADP GUIDELINES
In 1972 Department of Defense Instruction (DGDINST)
5200.28 titled "Security Requirements for ADP Systems" was
released. This instruction saw the need for placing minimum
requirements on constituent DOD organizations to provide for
the protection of new information resources. Ten years
later in 19S2, the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) came
out with the first Navy wide "ADP Security Manual". Indi-
vidual commands within the Navy were tasked to comply with
the requirements of this manual by tailoring these policies
to their organization and by appointing an ADP Security
Officer to preside over command computer operations.
Navy commands were having trouble interpreting the
requirements of the security manual. This brought the Navy
Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) into the guidance writing
picture with the publication of their Advisory Bulletins
which attempted to help commands interpret the ADP Security
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Manual. Many o-f the problems with this OPNAV instruction
had to do with the definition of ADP equipment. Users were
unsure of whether their small microcomputer was ADP
equipment and subject to this policy. NAVDAC defined ADP
equipment as such.
"Instruction 5239. 1 A applies to all ADP equipment within
the activity; not just the computer room. Memory
typewriters, word processors, micro computers and
computers in support of numerical control programming
Are some of the equipment... that is covered by
5239. lA." Cref.l3:p.l3
In April of 1985, change one to the ADP Security Manual went
into effect and remains the current OPNAV guidance.
The DOD, realizing that a 1972 instruction could use
some refinement in light of the advances made in computing
reissued 5200.28 in March of 1988. The term ADP was left
behind in favor of the more modern AIS or Automated
Information Systems.
In order to comply with the OPNAV ADP Security Manual
the Superintendent Naval Postgraduate School issued his own
instruction on 30 June 1989 stating as its purpose: "to
protect classified and sensitive data and systems by raising
awareness, providing contingency planning and identifying
appropriate countermeasures to avoid or minimize losses due
to; sabotage physical damage or destruction, other losses
(theft), misuse of resources and unauthorized access to
equipment files or data" Cref . 8: p. 3-1 3 . NAVPGSCQL 5239.1
appoints the Command ADP Security Officer and defines the
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responsibilities -for ADP System Security 0-f-ficers (ADPSSO)s.
The ADPSSOs are to serve as department -focal points -for all
security matters pertaining to assigned ADP Systems and are
to report to the command ADP Security 0-f-ficer. Department
heads, curricul ar o-f-ficers and department chairmen are made
responsible to ensure strict compliance with this
instruction. Cre-f.8:p.l3
Unlike the OPNAV instruction, the NPS ADP Security Plan
leaves no doubt as to what systems are covered by it; "All
data and all facilities -for processing data" Cre-f .8:p. 1 — 1 3
.
For additional clarification the instruction categorizes all
the computer systems on campus as being either level I, II
or III. Level I systems are those utilizing classified data
and have the toughest security requirements. Level II
operations cannot handle classified information but may
contain sensitive official or privacy act data. Level III
systems are only allowed unclassified unofficial data and
a^re afforded the lowest level of security precautions.
NAVPGSCOLINST 5239.1 defines the LANs operating within
the Administrative Science Department as level III systems
and requires the following protection.
- Must provide protection of physical assets from loss or
theft.
• Allow a provision for replacement service should any
system go down (e.g. systems should have a back-up).
Must have contingency plans for continued operation of
critical systems (but fails to define critical systems).
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- Must limit access to government personnel on government
business. Cref .Srp. 5-21
Also required by this instruction -for the Administrative
Science Labs are Level II ADP Microcomputer Security
Statements along with applicable sections of the
Microcomputer Security Questionnaire. These -forms are to be
used when applying -for accreditation through the ADP
Security Officer and are to be filled out by: "each person
who has, manages, and/or controls a stand-alone personal
computer or a networked computer which may be used in a
stand-alone mode." Cref-8:p.2] Upon completion of this
form, the undersigned acknowledges an understanding of the
protection necessary for Level II data and that it is/is not
processed on equipment under his cognizance.
Another area of concern mentioned in the NFS ADP
security plan is the violation of software copyrights.
"Adherence to copyright licensing agreements for
software used at NPS or operated on its behalf will be
strictly observed, and software will not be installed on
ADP equipment for which it is not specifically licensed
or authorized for use. Commercial software will not be
copied for personal use or retention." Eref .8:p.2-l
3
Enforcement of this policy is a challenge yet to be
mastered. Warnings should be posted in each lab informing
users of the school policy and of their required compliance
with this direction.
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B. OTHER PERTINENT GUIDANCE
Just as each level in the chain—of—command has written
ADP/AIS security plans, there exists the same level o-f
guidance -for the more general topic o-f physical security and
loss prevention. Referenced in the OPNAV ADP Security plan
is OPNAVINST 5530. 14A, "Physical Security and Loss
Prevention" and in the NPS ADP Plan, NAVPGSCOL INST 5530.2,
"Physical Security Plan". Specific requirements and
guidelines for physical security of ADP systems are
mentioned as well as the threat from which each type of
system must be protected.
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V. CASE STUDIES IN LAN IMPLEMENTATION
Ab part o-f the research into LAN protection mechanisms
other academic institutions with microcomputer networks were
investigated. This chapter is a summary o-f the problems
encountered in two academic organizations specifically in
regards to local network security- The solutions that they
implemented are also presented for consideration to
determine potential for use within the Administrative
Science labs.
A. PLYMOUTH POLYTECHNIC
The idea to implement a LAN at Plymouth Polytechnic,
Plymouth, England developed out of experimentation conducted
within the mathematics and statistics department to share
the resources of a CORVUS 10MB disk among 6 Apple computers
using the CORVUS Constellation star network. This trial
proved successful and coupled with the fact that their
mainframe was suffering from increased work load, a decision
was reached to expand the network. An additional 16 Apple
computers were purchased and the hard disk was upgraded to a
20MB version. Cref . 14: p. 403 The new lab was used to teach
BASIC and PASCAL programming and was used by 450 students a
week. The popularity of the lab caused increased demands on
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the LAN and soon expansion was necessary to include a total
o-f 33 Apple computers and a 40MB central disk store.
Cre-F. 14:p.41D
At the time o-f the LAN installation, Apple computers
were the standard 8-bit microcomputers available -for
purchase at the institution. This policy o-f standardization
throughout the university allowed for compatibility and
support service through contract maintenance.
1. Network Operations
The network installation at Polytechnic spans three
rooms: the open access lab, the central resources room and
the teaching lab Cre-f . 14:p. 41 U . The primary advantage o-f
this arrangement is that the -file server is inaccessible to
a regular user. A second advantage is that open access to
network resources can occur in one lab while the other is
used -for instructional purposes.
Additional physical security is obtained by using
diskless computers at the user nodes. Each workday morning
the labs are unlocked and a master power switch is turned
on. An automatic boot is made by each Apple to the central
hard disk which displays a logon message. Each student or
-faculty member logs on with a password and, depending on the
logon code, is given particular access rights and a volume
o-f disk space. Cre-f . 14: p. 433 Operations aire very
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"mainframe like" with vital system -files out o-f reach o-f the
user. The advantage o-f this system; secure so-ftware.
Although this network has the security features of
being able to place boundaries around the user and
consolidating the central computing equipment in an
unaccessible space, the advantage is lost during evening
operations.
"After the last session of the day the lecturer switches
off the master switch and locks the door. If students
wish to use a laboratory after this time then control is
exercised by the janitors. Two departmental students
have to accept responsibility for the evening by
reporting to the janitor and signing a book. Once these
students are signed in others may use the laboratory....
Before being able to sign out one student stays in the
lab while the other fetches the janitor to check that
everything is in order, switch off and lock the door."
Cref . 14:pp. 43-443
Reasons are not given why this method of after hours oper-
ation was chosen after taking care to provide a reasonable
amount of built in security.
2. Security Problems Encountered
In addition to the above situation (which was not
viewed as a problem by the network administrator) two other
security oriented problems were discussed. First, because
of systems operation, logon codes for all users are avail-
able in each Apple's RAM before logging in. By using the
BASIC commands "peek" and "poke", it is possible to access
and/or modify this information. It is conceivable there-
fore, for a student or other knowledgeable user to get the
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«network managers code and access all 40MB o-f the hard disk-
Read and write privileges can be modi-fied thereby enabling
the deletion o-f all files! Cre-f . 14:p. 473
Another problem encountered at Polytechnic (which
does not come as a surprise in light o-f their operating
procedures) was theft. Within a period of 18 months three
microcomputers, two disk drives, and a graphics printer had
been stolen out of their labs Cref . 14:p. 473 . To combat this
problem a security system was installed which consisted of a
wire running through all of the equipment. If any item was
removed and the wire broken an alarm would be activated and
a light displayed in the janitor's office Cref . 14: p. 483
.
B. VIRUSES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE
The open environment of academic computing has a dark
side to it also as discovered by the lab staff at several
microcomputer labs at the University of Delaware. Two
microcomputer viruses struck within a year which caused lab
operating problems as well as the destruction of data.
1. The Brain Virus
This virus was first discovered by lab staff in the
main library's microcomputing lab when responding to student
complaints about retrieving files on what appeared to be
undamaged diskettes. Using the DOS command "chkdsk" the lab
staff found an unusual volume label "Brain" as well as 3072
bytes in three bad sectors on several disks. They -further
analyzed these disks with Norton Utilities and discovered
the -Following message in the boot sector o-f a disk:
"Welcome to the Dungeon. Copyright 1986 Basit 8< Amjad
(pvt) Ltd. Brain Computing Services 730 Nizam Block
All am Lahore Pakistan BEWARE OF THIS VIRUS CONTACT US
FOR VACCINATION. " Cref . 9: p. 2843
The authors o-f the Brain virus replaced the contents o-f the
boot area of track zero (which on DOS systems is reserved
-for operating system -files and tables) with their own
operating system program and the above message. The actual
virus code was located in three sectors and hidden -from view
by identi-fying them as bad sectors. Cref . 9:p. 2843
The virus begins its destructive li-fe when a
computer is booted with an in-fected diskette. The virus
program is retained in memory, then when a person using an
application package such as Lotus 1—2—3 or Wordstar issues a
file save command, the application communicates the request
to the virus in-fected operating system which issues an I/O
interrupt. But instead o-f pointing to the location in RAM
where the data to be saved is stored, the virus program is
instead -flagged and then trans-ferred to the target disk.
Once on the target disk Brain destroys data or -files by
writing bad sectors to the -file allocation table (FAT). I-f
this disk is a DOS-bootable disk it can now go on to in-fect
others. Cre-f . 9: p. 284 3
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The Brain virus was proli-fic, having spread to over
50yi o-f the main library's software programs and approximate-
ly 5X o-f other microcomputer labs software. All micro labs
were operating on overtime in order to check each hard disk
and software program for signs of infection. Several labs
were closed for two days denying services to students and
faculty in order to purge the virus. Many hours of staff
overtime were needed to clean the infected systems which
resulted in a cost of $500.00 Cref . 9: p. 284 3
.
2. The Scores Virus
A second virus to spread throughout the university
was detected throughout Macintosh labs. Users began to
experience system crashes while using the programs MacWrite,
MacDraw and Excel and also when attempting to print.
Investigation of user complaints led to the discovery of
dog—eared page icons and hidden files named Scores and
Desktop on the suspect disks. Cref . 9: p. 284D
The case of the Scores virus is an example of how
contagious these programs really are. Reportedly, the
Scores virus was written to target two proprietary pieces of
software named ERIC and VAULT at Electronic Data Services
Inc.. Scores was meant to crash these programs without
destroying data or program files. Its introduction into the
outside world was apparently a mistake. Cref . 9: p. 2493
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Scores was passed -from one Mac to another by
in-fected application programs. Hidden in a program's
initialization code the virus installs itself in the Mac's
operating system by adding unseen -files to the systems
•folder. The virus program becomes loaded into RAM when the
machine boots and then goes hunting -for uninfected programs.
When one is located the virus is inserted into the
application and a pointer in the software Jump table directs
the legitimate program to jump to the virus program during
execution. The resulting effect is to slow down program
operation and randomly interrupt input/output functions
which occasionally caused program crashes. Cref . 9:p.285D
3. Lessons Learned
University computing centers must always be vigilant
for virus infestations due to their operating environment-
Virus symptoms to watch out for are hidden operating system
or executable files and unordinary features attached to
initialization areas of disks. This requires a better than
average knowledge of microcomputer operations along with a
good utility program (for example Norton Utilities) to
examine diskettes for these signs. Viruses are written by
individuals with systems—level programming knowledge — not
beginners. Cref . 9: p. 2873
A second characteristic in the detection of viruses
is that they take advantage of input/output functions to
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replicate. Detection is possible though di-fficult by
noticing unusual events during I/O operations Cre-f.9
: p. 2873. Always use write protect -features on data
diskettes
!
A most important characteristic to remember is that
viruses are carried by unsuspecting users Cre-f . 9:p. 2883. A
procedure used in many University of Delaware's microcomput-
ing labs was the daily checking of hard disks and software
returned to lab check-out desks Eref . 9:p. 284 3 . The bottom
line is that there is no substitute for a good network
system administrator and good computer operating procedures.
Never use untested software or allow machines to boot from
foreign disks. Informing users of the telltale signs of a
virus infection and the dangers which they pose through
briefings or other notification methods is an important step
toward safe computing.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Through the -first -five chapters, a -framework -for
evaluating necessary security -features was established.
This chapter is concerned with describing some o-f them as
well as recommending new procedures to implement. A
suggested future academic LAN is presented and the o-ften
overlooked issue of sta-f-f requirements is discussed.
A. IMPLEMENTED SECURITY MEASURES
Having investigated the lab's equipment con-figuration,
network operating procedures, guidance, the threat and other
LAN implementations, security measures in place and
operating on the Administrative Science LANs will be
evaluated. This in-formation is necessary in order to make
in-formed decisions on the e-f -fecti veness o-f installed
protection measures and their appropriateness in light o-f
the risk they aire made to guard against. The Administrative
Science LANs Are unique in that they operate 24—hours—a—day
in, frequently, an unattended environment.
1. Automation of Processes
Common to all four networks previously discussed is
the attempt to take the user out of the start-up process as
much as possible by automating tasks where there is a
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propensity -for errors. This is o-F particular importance in
the Administrative Science LANs where there is a great
diversity in levels o-f user knowledge. Some users are new
to personal computers while others have used them for years.
Anecdotal stories are prevalent in the computer
publications about people who are experiencing microcom-
puters for the first time. These stories may help explain
why taking the initiative away from certain users may be the
wise thing to do. One may have heard the tale about the new
user who uses magnets to hold floppy disks to the side of
his machine then wonders why there is a problem in reading
them or the new Mac user who, when confronted with the
instruction, "Click Mouse Button Here", held the mouse to
the screen and clicked away. Cref . 15:p . 71
D
In all fairness to new users, they are not the only
ones the LANs need to be protected from. An experienced
system manager was approached while extremely busy and was
asked for assistance. Instead he gave the requester
additional privileges and soon forgot about the matter until
considerable damage was done to his system by the newly
empowered user. Security experts are split over whether
computer security is meant to cover "stupid acts"
Cref . 16: p. 683 . If "stupid acts" can cause damage, then they
a.r e a security problefri and require protective measures.
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Automating the start-up process as much as possible
through liberal use of ".bat" -files protects against both o-f
these situations and is an integral part o-f LAN security.
The alternative requires users to become familiar with
network menu screens particularly with IBM PC—LAN software.
Temptation to experiment in unfamiliar areas is restricted
by defaulting to an automated process which also speeds up
the entire logon procedure. Some degree of automation is
implemented on all LANs within the Administrative Science
labs.
2. Limiting Write Access
This feature can occur in several ways. First,
programs which utilize data files created by users should be
set up (via .bat files) to cause the system to read from and
write to floppy drives. This protects both the user <from
having his data erased from a fixed drive by another user)
and the system administrators (from having to clean up these
fixed dri ves)
.
Secondly, files and directories containing
application software should use network operating system
functions or the DOS attrib command to make these files read
only. This is contingent on the applications involved.
There Are a few programs which require write access to
themselves in order to record user inputs or modifications.
These programs will not run if file protection is set to
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read only- Where the DOS attrib command is used to set
write protection -for -files, care is taken to delete
"ATTRIB.EXE" -from the DOS directory so that users cannot
invoke it to remove write protection- A sa-fe practice used
within the Administrative Science LANs is to keep it on a
-floppy disk available only to lab sta-f-f per-forming network
mai ntenance.
On LANs such as the 3-Com EtherSeries or the
AppleTalk Network, the LAN operating system allows the
administrator to make entire directories write protected.
This can only occur provided that application software
operating on the network does not require write access-
These LANs can also be set up to create private volumes for
each user to do with what they please- The drawback to this
method is the time required of the network administrators to
register each user and keep the system current
-
One obvious but often overlooked method of write
protection is to utilize the write protect tabs on floppy
disks. This i s of particular importance on the IBM PC-LAN
Ethernet and the AppleTalk Network since these LANs boot
from floppy disks and, as in the IBM PC-LAN, applications
programs Skre set up to write output to that same drive. It
is all too easy to start the network from the user disks
then without removing them, issue an instruction to write to
that disk thinking it has been replaced with a data disk or
even worse a disk you intend to -format!
3. Restrict Costly Operations
Although this may seem to go against the objective
of providing the greatest amount of computing resources to
the user, it is nonetheless in line with keeping operating
costs within reason. Currently the only printer facilities
available on the AppleTalk Net are that of the LaserWriter-
This high cost of operation item (due to the toner and
copier grade paper required) is used for many print
functions which ultimately end up in the trash. Draft
copies, test printouts, and "I just wanted to see what it
looked I ike's" were using expensive resources at a high
rate.
It was discovered that costs could be kept down if
the LaserWriter were only made available between the hours
of 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM. At the end of the day a member of
the lab staff would remove the toner cartridge and lock it
up. The next morning it would be reinstalled. Using this
method one toner cartridge was made to last an entire
academic quarter (about 12 weeks) where before it would only
last two—thirds of the quarter.
46
B. PHYSICAL SECURITY
This aspect of lab operations was discussed in Chapter
III and, as a whole, is found to be a strength in the
overall security implemented on the LANs. Compared to the
theft problems as described in the Plymouth Polytechnic case
study the labs of the Administrative Science Department
appear to be Fort Knox. This is not to be taken to mean
that improvements should not be considered or ideas
evaluated for the benefit of enhancing a secure operation.
1. Change Combinations Frequently
The basic premise of changing combinations at least
once a quarter is a good one but albeit, just a concept.
Nowhere in writing does it state that the lab combinations
will be changed on a quarterly basis. The current codes
were in effect well over three months ago and a.rB overdue
for changing.
In all fairness to the lab administrative staff,
this is not necessarily an oversight on their part. A
bureaucratic paper work drill must be accomplished each time
the combination is to be changed by the Public Works
Department. Streamlining this process by negotiating a
standing work order to change the combinations on a regular
basis would make this task easier on all involved.
The physical protection of file and print servers has
led to some interesting implementations in the
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Administrative Science labs. These methods have proven
success-f ul
.
• Locking the Server Keyboard - A simple but effective
means to prevent use of the dedicated file server as a
user node.
• Install Keyboard Lock Box - This is a device that plugs
into the keyboard attachment port into which the
keyboard is attached. A key lock prevents activation of
the keyboard when it is not desired.
• Remove Keyboard Entirely - For use on XT style servers
where locks are not provided. Along with removal of the
keyboard the receptacle where it attaches to the "box"
is blocked using a bolt, nut and washers. This hinders
the plugging in of another keyboard to access the
dedicated server.
- Locking the On/Off Switch - Prevents turning power off
to a dedicated server. Effective only if saboteur is
prevented from tracing power cord back to wall
receptacle.
Enclose Entire Server - A method specifically designed
for the AppleTalk network of Macintoshes where the
server keyboard cannot be locked or the attachment
receptacle blocked. Placing the entire server in a
locked cabinet prevents tampering of any kind. A locked
room would be the next step up providing additional
protection by preventing the power cord from being
unplugged.
2. Tethering Equipment
The practice of securing equipment with locks and
steel cords is a better one than relying on an alarm system
(again as in the Polytechnic case). Preventing the removal
of what you Are attempting to protect is always a better
option than notification after the fact. There are however
two weaknesses with the current tethering process. The
first is that the self-adhesive pad which anchors the tether
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to the piece o-f gear can be easily removed with the twist o-f
a screwdriver. Secondly, a -few o-f the tethers on IBM and
compatible computers allow enough slack to remove the
exterior case and access expensive expansion cards.
A more secure means o-f tethering could be accom-
plished by -finding a good position on the computer case to
attach a latch which would serve two purposes. First it
could be used to prevent the case -from being removed and
secondly it could be used as a more secure attachment point
for the tether. I-f this proves to be in-feasible, at minimum
the tether cords should be shortened to prevent the
microcomputer's case -from being removed.
3. Installation o-f Sa-fety Equipment
In addition to providing protection to prevent
the-ft o-f equipment, another physical security concern is the
protection o-f equipment -from physical damage. Noticeably
missing -from the Administrative Science labs are C02 -fire
extinguishers. Although not required by the base -fire
department, they should be installed as soon as -feasible,
one per lab. This is not only for the obvious reason of
extinguishing any casualty that might occur but also to
prevent additional damage from occurring due to the actions
of a panicked user. Often the damage caused by the wrong
agent to combat the casualty (using water on an electronic
fire) is greater than the fire damage itself.
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A safety -feature does not always have to be a
physical device. The posting o-f warnings and operational
instructions can prevent harm to equipment when heeded by
users. At minimum boot up instructions should be clearly
displayed, as they Are in the Administrative Science labs,
as well as step by step guidance to per-form -feats such as
changing printer paper. Also it is recommended that all lab
users be reminded that the LANs are -for government business
and Sire limited to unci assi-f ied, non—privacy act data.
4. Conduct Regular Backups
One of the requirements given for a good security
plan was the specification of disaster recovery methods.
Conducting regular backups of the software on a network and
on each user machine will be of immense help in restoring
the LAN to pre-disaster operations. No matter how often
this idea is put forth someone is placed in an uncom-
fortable position for failure to carry out this advice.
C. ESTABLISH SECURITY POLICY
Because of the unique requirements of the academic
environment in which the Administrative Science LANs
operate, much of the effort to keep them secure will reside
with the individual user. It is therefore, important to
provide them with established and consistent information as
to their duties and responsibilities as network users. The
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best way to accomplish this is through a well de-fined, well
publicized security policy.
An ADP security policy dictates who can do what, to what
data. This is en-forced by a protection mechanism . a
combination o-f hardware and software -features which trans-
late the policy into action. These protection mechanisms
must be -flexible enough to adapt to changing security
policies. Cref . 7: p. 2943 Much o-f what has been discussed as
implemented within the labs would be classified as
protection mechanisms. Absent is the policy which these
mechanisms are enforcing-
1. Develop and Implement a Security Plan
Armed with the guidance and direction given in
Chapter IV, a Local Area Network Security Plan should be
developed and made public for use within the Administrative
Science Department as soon as possible. The policy should
clearly define directions given from higher authority (DOD,
DON, NAVDAC and NFS) and, according to one reference,
include as a minimum an explanation of the following:
- The organization's security philosophy
• Security procedures to be followed by personnel
- Responsibilities and procedures for reporting violations
- Procedures for implementing operation revisions
Cref . 4: p. 663
- What will happen to violators of this policy
Cref .4:p.68D
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To ensure widest distribution o-f this policy users
would be given an outline o-f the security plan, no more than
•four o-f -five pages, when they register -for the combination
to the labs. Any emergent policy change could be
distributed through news letters placed within the various
labs, as a boot-up message on the network or as a message on
the school's mainframe sent to all lab users.
2. Involve Upper Management
There is no better method to achieving cooperation
among subordinates then by management setting a good example
to -follow. Publicizing statements taken -from the
Superintendent's ADP Security Plan will emphasize to the
users the -fact that LAN security is serious business and a
shared responsibility not to be taken lightly. Training and
orientation periods a^re also per -feet times to instill good
practices to new users.
Another way to emphasize a commitment to security
is to explain what will happen to violators o-f the security
plan. This should be done without sounding like a series o-f
threats but with enough conviction that notice will be
taken. Included within this policy would be the revocation
o-f lab privileges -for minor in-fractions all the way up to
and including the report o-f serious violations to the base
police. Better cooperation can will be obtained i-f all
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concerned understand why certain policies are the way they
are.
D. VIRUS PROTECTION
A new threat which must be -faced in today's computing
environment is the hazard o-f contracting a virus. Viruses
are particularly proli-fic on microcomputers since most all
o-f them have little or no built in security -features.
Conversely, applications running on main-frames, are in most
cases, restricted to the region assigned to them and can't
in-fect other applications or the operating system unless put
there on purpose. Cref . 12: p. 41 3 Three primary methods o-f
virus prevention are discussed in the -following sections.
1. Sa-fe Operating Procedures
The primary sources o-f viruses are programs listed
on bulletin boards, programs borrowed from -friends or so-ft —
ware libraries and -free evaluation so-ftware Cre-f . 12:p. 41 D .
Refraining from using these sources of software is a wise
decision. Should it become necessary to use a program from
one of these sources it should be proven first on a
"quarantined" machine before being placed into operation.
After running the suspect program, review your C0MMAND.COM
IBMBI0.COM and IBMD0S.COM files to see if they have been
al tered.
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A computer should never be booted -from anything but
a proven disk or the computer's hard drive. To prevent the
occurrence of this, add-in cards aire made which -force a
computer to boot -from a pre—defined drive any time it is
started Cref . 17: p. 293 . LAN users should be instructed to
boot only from the appropriate source-
2. Antiviral Programs and Utilities
Blocking a viruses entry into RAM or preventing it
from doing damage should a virus make it into memory are the
principle functions of antiviral products Cref . 12:p.41 3.
Some programs such as BOMBSQUAD remain RAM resident and
monitor all calls to the BIOS. The program will then
display the consequences of the call and ask if you wish
this to occur. C—4 is another RAM resident program which
monitors for virus activity such as writes to executable
files or modifications to systems files. Cref . 10: p. 54-553
There are several disadvantages in using these
antiviral programs. First, the experienced user will soon
tire of having to respond to questions from the software
regarding legitimate I/O operations. A second problem is
what to do about programs which write to themselves and it
happens to occur in an executable file. C—4 may flag this
as an illegal operation!
Hardware devices such as the Disk Defender are also
available as antivirus protective mechanisms. This device
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is a plug-in expansion card that is capable of write
protecting all or part of a hard drive. A removable control
box plugs into the card and is used to switch the write
protection on and off. Unchanging files can be stored in a
write protected partition of a hard disk while changing
files can be stored where write access is allowed.
Eref . 10:p. 573 This device can also be used on all machines
with hard disks to prevent users from clobbering them with
unauthorized software installations.
To borrow a phrase from Frederick Brooks, "there is no
silver bullet" which will conquer all computer security
problems. Academic computing systems will continue to be
susceptible to the influences discussed herein. Until
software is designed from the bottom up with security in
mind, this problem will continue to be a managerial one.
Innovative thinking as well as a thorough knowledge of
available resources are the tools LAN managers have to
combat the threat.
E. LAN OF THE FUTURE
The centralized vs. decentralized computer architecture
argument has come full swing. The advantages of a central
mainframe computer which placed bounds and limits on users
was soon forgotten with the advent of the microcomputer.
Connectivity became the key word and the power of computing
was put in the hands of the users. Now we find that maybe
we have given them too much.
The academic LAN o-f the -future should be a compromise
between control and resource sharing. A -file server with a
large secondary storage capacity containing program
applications should be networked to user computers with
write protected -fixed drives containing operating system and
network start-up software. The system shall be configured
to write only to the floppy disk. No application programs
will be installed if they require write access. All
resources will continue to be shared as before while
achieving the goal of placing boundaries around users.
Operating systems such as OS/2 promise to help achieve this
goal by providing memory protection for programs and data.
F. NEED FOR DEDICATED STAFF
To the casual user the LAN operates on its own. They
walk in, start it up, do their work and leave without ever
seeing a staff member. Thanks to the computer's ability to
automate processes it is often forgotten that humans are
needed at all. This is prevalent throughout society where
the thinking is "if we automate we can reduce man hours".
The mundane chores which cannot be automated such as repair,
daily maintenance, writing or maintaining a current security
plan, changing paper, software installation, replacing
expended resources, training, ordering spares, documentation
and planning must still be accomplished by someone.
Many o-f the security features mentioned can be automated
and Are. This in no way can replace the good computing
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